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TORTS-PARENT'S RECOVERY FOR LOSS OF
SOCIETY AND COMPANIONSHIP OF CHILD
In situations where a child has been killed or injured as the
result of a third party's negligent, tortious act, case law over-
whelmingly supports the view that a parent may not recover dam-
ages from the third-party tortfeasor for the loss of the child's so-
ciety and companionship.' A growing minority of cases, however,
have expreessly recognized that such losses are recoverable, and
other cases have employed language susceptible to the interpreta-
tion that recovery for such losses may be allowed.2 While most of
this development has been in the area of wrongful death, rather
than personal injury, the analysis for one area is without distinc-
tion from the analysis for the other.' Consideration will be given
to the cases in which this issue has been raised, and to the justifica-
tions that courts have used to arrive at their decisions to exclude
or include such loss as an element of damages.
I. THE TRAMONAL VIEw: A PARENT MAY NOT REcOvER FOR Loss
OF A CHImD's SocImY AND COMPANIONSHM
Traditionally, a child was considered by the law to be in the
same relationship with his parent as a servant was to his master.,
That is, a child, like a servant, was thought to be solely an eco-
nomic asset to his family because he was another source of income,
at least to the extent of paying his upkeep. Child labor was crucial
to 'he economic system at that time,5 but socially, the child was
I See generally McGarr v. National & Providence Worsted Mills, 24 R.I. 447,
53 A. 320 (1902); Quinn v. City of Pittsburgh, 243 Pa. 521, 90 A. 353 (1914).
In a personal injury case, a parent may recover the entire value of the child's
lost services on the theory that the parent will have to bear the cost of raising the
injured child. C. McCoRmicK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAmoES §91 (1935). In the
wrongful death situation the parent has been allowed to recover only the value of
the loss of services as reduced by the cost of raising the child who has been killed,
and the value of such services and contributions as the parents could have reasona-
bly expected to receive from that child during his majority. C. McCoRMIcK, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §101 (1935).
2Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 553, 555 (1976).
In the analysis of the cause of action for loss of services and society of a child,
courts freely cite as authority cases from either wrongful death or personal injury
actions, regardless of which is before the bar in a particular suit. See, e.g., Shockley
v. Prier, 66 Wis.2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).
' Katz, Schroeder & Sidman, Emancipating Our Children-Coming of Legal
Age in America, 7 FAm. L.Q. 211, 212 (1973).
&Id.
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deemed to be of little worth. Intangible feelings such as sentiment,
affection and companionship derived from the society of a child
were deemed to be legally nonexistent.' This view of a child's place
in society dates back to colonial America, where children occupied
the lowest rung of the social ladder.'
As a result of this concept of a child's status, loss of services
and wages of the injured or deceased child came to be recognized
as a customary and necessary element of recoverable damages.' In
most jurisdictions that considered the question, however, the view
became firmly established that a parent had no cause of action for
the recovery of damages for the loss of a child's society and com-
panionship. This strictly pecuniary view of a parent's loss which
results from a child's death was emphatically stated in McGarr v.
National & Providence Worsted Mills:'
[Tihe proper measure of damages is the pecuniary value of the
child's services from the time of the injury until it attains its
majority ... In short, the measure of damages in such a case
is the same as that which obtains in a case brought by a master
for the loss of services of his servant or apprentice. It is therefore
practically a business and commercial question only, and the
elements of affection and sentiment have no place therein."
Today, most jurisdictions still recognize the traditional view
and deny recovery for loss of society and companionship. Gener-
ally, courts do not discuss the basis of their holding that a parent
is limited to recovery for loss of a child's services, and seem content
to merely cite precedent that denies loss of society and companion-
ship as elements of damage. 1 In New York, there have been three
cases in which the issue has been raised since 1963.12 Each of these
6 Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an
Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590, 599 (1976).
7 Under the English common law, there was no recovery allowed a parent for
the wrongful dbath of a child; legally, a child was worthless to his parents. 25
BAYLOR L. REv. 118 (1973). To remedy this situation, Lord Campbell's Act, Origi-
nally, Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, was enacted by Parliament.
While the act did not provide a yardstick by which to measure damages, the English
court held that damages were to be based solely on pecuniary loss and not the loss
of comfort, society and companionship. Blake v. Midland Ry. Co., 18 Q.B. 93, 118
Eng. Rep. 35 (1852).
25 BAYLOR L. Rzv. 118 (1973).
24 R.I. 447, 53 A. 320 (1902).
10 Id. at 460-61, 53 A. at 325-26.
" Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 553, 555 (1976).
12 White v. City of New York, 37 A.D.2d 603, 322 N.Y.S. 2d 920 (1971); Beyer
2
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three cases briefly hold that the loss of a child's society by a parent
is not compensable; cite a 1946 case 3 as controlling; but give no
explanation of why such a conclusion was made. Likewise, the
Alabama," North Dakota" and Mississippi" courts state that no
recovery is allowable to a parent for loss of society and companion-
ship of an injured child, but put forth no rationale for the decision.
Several courts denying recovery for loss of society and com-
panionship to a parent, however, have presented additional
grounds for denial. One such ground is that the loss of a child's
society and companionship by a parent is intangible and therefore
not compensable. 17 Money cannot really compensate the parent for
the loss he suffers as the result of the death or injury of his child;
thus, it is reasoned that the parent would be receiving a windfall
benefit unrelated to the loss, rather than receiving compensation
for actual damages incurred. The argument on this point results
from balancing the inadequacy of monetary damages used to make
the loss whole against the social cost of paying such awards. 8 Most
awards of damages of this type would be satisfied by insurance
policies, and the burden of paying such awards would be shoul-
dered by the general public in the form of increased insurance
v. Murray, 33 A.D.2d 246, 306 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1970); Foti v. Quittel, 19 A.D.2d 635,
241 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1963).
13 Gilbert v. Stanton Brewery, 295 N.Y. 270, 67 N.E.2d 155 (1946). In Gilbert
v. Stanton Brewery, the Court of Appeals of Nev( York gives no reason for its denial
of the cause of action either, except that Werbolovsky v. New York & Boston
Despatch Exp. Co., 63 Misc. 329, 117 N.Y.S. 150(1909), did not allow it. 295 N.Y.
at 273, 67 N.E.2d at 156. Werbolovsky, cites without further explanation Barnes v.
Keene, 132 N.Y. 13, 29 N.E. 1090 (1892), as authority for its holding. 63 Misc. at
330, 117 N.Y.S. at 150. Barnes states that the only allowable compensation is for
pecuniary loss, including the value of the child's services, and cites as authority
Cuming v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 109 N.Y. 95, 16 N.E. 65 (1888); Drew v. Sixth Ave.
R. Co., 26 N.Y. 49 (1862); and Whitney v. Hitchcock, 4 Denio 461 (1847). 132 N.Y.
at 15, 29 N.E. at 1090.
11 Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Baker, 161 Ala. 135, 136-37, 49 So.
755, 755-56 (1909).
11 Kalsow v. Grob, 61 N.D. 119, 122, 237 N.W. 848, 849 (1931). In disallowing
recovery for loss of society and companionship the court points out that such has
been the law in North Dakota since 1900, and cites Haug v. Great N. Ry. Co., 8
N.D. 23, 77 N.W. 97 (1898), and Scherer v. Schlaberg, 18 N.D. 421, 122 N.W. 1000
(1909), as authority.
" Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So.2d 812, 816-17 (Miss. 1972).
E.g., Baxter v. Superior Court of Lost Angeles County, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 464,
563 P.2d 871, 873, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315, 317 (1977).
"1 Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 447, 563 P.2d 858, 862, 138
Cal. Rptr. 302, 306 (1977).
[Vol. 80
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premiums or, otherwise, in the "enhanced danger" that accrues
from a greater number of people choosing to go without insurance
as the result of higher costs."
The difficulty involved in measuring the damages actually
suffered as a result of the loss of something as intangible as a
child's society and companionship is also advanced as a reason to
deny a parent's recovery."' A court may find it hard to set a stan-
dard by which to decide when an award of $10,000 is inadequate
or an award of $500,000 is excessive.2' This difficulty in defining
and quantifying damages leads to a risk of double recovery,22 for
asking a jury to distinguish the logs to the parent of his child's
society and companionship from his loss of the child's services may
be asking too much.? While similar arguments have been raised
and rejected in regard to a wife's action for loss of consortium, 24
courts respond with the rationale that such a holding in regard to
the parent-child relationship "would imply an indefinite extension
of liability for loss of consortium to all foreseeable relationships."
It appears that the courts which hold this view fear an uncontrolla-
ble trend in the judiciary to grant similar awards to more distant
relations and friends of the injured child. Such a result would
presumably flow from the precedent set by allowing a parent a
" Id.
Baxter v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 464, 563 P.2d
871, 873, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315, 317 (1977).
1 Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 448, 563 P.2d 858, 863, 138
Cal. Rptr. 302, 307 (1977).
" Baxter v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 464, 563 P.2d
871, 873, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315, 317 (1977).
n Cf. Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 448, 563 P.2d 858, 863,
138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 307 (1977). It would appear that the allowance of lost society
and companionship as an element of damages would not foreclose the use of loss of
services as an element of damages, too. In Washington, which allows the recovery
of lost society and companionship in wrongful death cases, Lockhart v. Besel, 71
Wash. 2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967), a case has been heard in which the loss of society
and companionship was allowed as an element of damages arid the value of the
child's services was an allowable element as well, but the evidence showed that the
cost of care and maintenance would be more than or close to the value of the
services, so the verdict was reduced to exlude any amount reflecting loss of services.
Clark v. Icicle Irrigation Dist., 72 Wash. 2d 201, 432 P.2d 541 (1967).
2 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal.3d 382, 525 P.2d 669,
115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974); Ekalo v. Constructive Service Corp. of America, 46 N.J.
82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965).
21 Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal.3d 441, 448, 563 P.2d 858, 863, 138
Cal. Rptr. 302, 307 (1977).
4
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recovery, when previously the damages in question were strictly
confined to the marital relationship.
Finally, it has been argued that the logic used to award dam-
ages for loss of consortium in the marital relationship should be
extended to the parent-child relationship. The basis of this argu-
ment is that consortium in the spousal relationship is the same as
society and companionship in the parent-child relationship. Most
courts, however, have found that loss of consortium is not analo-
gous to the loss of society and companionship of a child because
the marital relationship is significantly different from that of
parent-child. In so doing, most courts cite the sexual aspects of the
husband-wife relationship as one example of the difference. This
very question was considered in Brennan v. Biber,2' where the New
Jersey court rejected the analogy.2 The New Jersey court had only
one year earlier allowed a wife a cause of action for loss of consor-
tium when her husband was injured,2 and the court in Brennan
held that the cause of action for loss of consortium by a wife was
an extension of the law that could be accomplished without "any
compulsion of going farther" and allowing a similar recovery in
the parent-child relationship. Consortium, it is reasoned, is more
than "services" in the ordinary sense."0 The Supreme Court of
California has held that there are significant differences between
the marital relationship and the parent-child relationship, and
that these differences support the limitation of a cause of action
for loss of consortium to the marital situation.' The court defended
" 93 N.J. Super. 351, 225 A.2d 742 (1966), affl'd, 99 N.J. Super. 247, 239 A.2d
261 (1968).
21 Id. at 366-67, 225 A.2d at 750.
21 Ekalo v. Constructive Service Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1
(1965). In Ekalo, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that, "[t]he law has
always been most solicitous of the husband and wife relationship, perhaps more so
than the parent and child relationship." Id. at 92, 215 A.2d at 6.
" 93 N.J. Super. at 367, 225 A.2d at 751.
31 When a wife is incapacitated from furnishing her husband with the custom-
ary wifely society and companionship, the loss, past and prospective, is an element
of damages the husband may recover from the wrongdoer. Apart from society and
companionship, this loss of "consortium" which the husband may recover includes
the value of the domestic duties the wife generally provides in return for the hus-
band's duty to provide her with proper support and maintenance. See C. McCoR-
MIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES §92 at 331-32 (1935).
31 Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal.3d 441, 444, 563 P.2d 858, 860, 138
Cal. Rptr. 302, 304-05 (1977). Consortium has been defined as the "loss of conjugal
fellowship and sexual relations." Id. at 443, 563 P.2d at 860, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
Other courts have reasoned that the husband-wife relationship is more worthy of
protection than the parent-child relationship when the loss is of the intangible
[Vol. 80
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this holding by pointing out that an "action for loss of consortium
rests in large part on the 'impairment or destruction of the sexual
life of the couple.' "32 Clearly, no similar element of damage is
present in the parent-child relationship.
Furthermore, though the loss of society and companionship in
the parent-child relationship is just as foreseeable as the loss of
consortium in the marital relationship, mere foreseeability of an
injury to a legally-recognized relationship does not necessarily pos-
tulate a cause of action; social policy must at some point intervene
to deter liability.3 As Judge Breitel stated in Tobin v. Grossman,3
"Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the rippling of the
waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree."" In dealing with
the concept of foreseeability in this area, some courts state that if
a cause of action for a parent's loss of society and companionship
is allowed, then a cause of action for brothers, sisters, cousins, in-
laws, friends, colleagues and acquaintances, who have been de-
prived of the injured party's companionship, will follow." Conse-
aspects of the relationship. See, e.g., Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co.,
262 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Smith v. Richardson, 277 Ala. 389, 171 So. 2d 96
(1965); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972); General
Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972). "Presumably, these courts have
focused on the marital relationship as a source of sexual satisfaction." Love,
Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured Per-
son's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590, 596-97 (1976).
2 Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 448, 563 P.2d 858, 863, 138
Cal. Rptr. 302, 307 (1977) (quoting Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d
382, 405, 525 P.2d 669, 684, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 780 (1974)).
" Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal.3d 441, 446, 563 P.2d 858, 861, 138
Cal. Rptr. 302, 305 (1977). The Borer case actually determined that there was not
an allowable cause of action for a child for the loss of parental consortium. The
Borer case had a companion case, Baxter v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977), which determined that no
cause of action existed for loss of a child's society and companionship. The reason-
ing and policy decisions used in Borer are often referred to and were relied on by
the court in Baxter as controlling. 19 Cal.3d at 463, 563 P.2d at 872, 138 Cal. Rptr.
at 316.
- 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419 (1969).
"I Id. at 619, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561, 249 N.E.2d at 424. The general thrust of this
type of analysis is that "enough is enough" and the liability for which the negligent
tortfeasor will be held responsible must be terminated at some point. The act which
leads to the suit is not willfully done and hence, there is only so much that the
negligent wrongdoer can be held accountable for before he is literally drained of all
his resources.
-u See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 446, 563 P.2d 858, 862,
138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306 (1977). The same court states in Baxter v. Superior Court
6
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quently, whether to allow a cause of action in the parent-child
relationship, when compared to the marital relationship, is a ques-
tion of policy rather than logic.3 7 The line must be drawn some-
where and the courts, absent a legislative determination, must
draw it. Most jurisdictions have chosen to draw the line at the
marital relationship. No other relationships, family or friend, will
support an action for loss of society and companionship in these
jurisdictions when such deprivation is the result of a negligently-
inflicted injury."
II. THE PROGRESSIVE VIEw: A PARENT MAY RECOVER FOR THE Loss
OF A CHILD's SocimTrY AND COMPANIONSHIP
The narrow pecuniary-loss test, which excludes recovery for
the loss of a child's society and companionship, may have met the
needs of the community in the last century when the American
society was still largely rural and a child was considered an eco-
nomic asset to the family. Changes which have occurred in the
economic life of our society since the test was first adopted, how-
ever, require reappraisal of its application today. 9 A child is no
longer an economic asset to his family."0 "It must be conceded that
the majority of today's children render far less service to their
parents than did children in the last century."4' Child labor laws"2
of Los Angeles County, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 464, 563 P.2d 871, 873, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315,
317 (1977):
To be sure, the risk of multiple claims and disproporionate awards is
slightly less in the present context [a parent's action for loss of a child's
society and companionship], since an injured child has only two parents
who can sue for loss of consortium, while an injured parent may have
many children. That minor difference between the cases [Borer and
Baxter], however, plainly does not suffice to justify allowing a parental
cause of action ...
11 Ekalo v. Constructive Service Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 92, 215 A.2d 1,
7 (1965); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 446, 563 P.2d 858, 862,
138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306 (1977). There are several states which do not allow a paren-
tal action for loss of society and companionship in a personal injury suit that will
allow it in the case of wrongful death. See generally Zeller v. Reid, 38 Cal.2d 622,
101 P.2d 730 (1940) (allowing such a recovery under CAL. CIV. Paoc. CODE § 377
(Deering's Cum. Supp. 1977)); Kelley v. Ohio River R. Co., 58 W. Va. 216, 52 S.E.
520 (1905) (allowing recovery in a wrongful death action under the applicable stat-
ute, now found at W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (Cure. Supp. 1977)).
SId.
Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 352, 113 N.W.2d 355, 359 (1961).
,o Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis.2d 394, 399, 225 N.W.2d 495, 498 (1975).
4 Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 352, 113 N.W.2d 355, 359 (1961).
42 Employment of children, where interstate commerce is involved, is regulated
today by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, especially 29 U.S.C.
[Vol. 80
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and the great increases in school and college attendance,, have
resulted in fewer children working outside the home. A child's true
value to his or her parent, once considered to be only sentimental
in character, should now be recognized as being that value mani-
fested by the society and comfort which flow from the relation-
ship,
44
In recent years, several courts have taken notice of these socie-
tal changes and have recognized that the pecuniary-loss test is
outmoded and does not, by itself, provide a proper vehicle for
assessing the damages incurred by a parent when his child has
been injured. These courts have stepped into a previously unex-
plored realm and permitted recovery for lost society and compan-
ionship.
One reason put forth by these courts for allowing such recovery
is that the loss of consortium in the spousal relationship is analo-
gous to the loss of society and companionship of a child. Although
the California court has rejected the analogous cause of action4'
largely because it fears an uncontrollable extension of such recov-
ery to more distant relationships,"8 the same court has stated,
"That the law might be urged to move too far. . . is an unaccepta-
ble excuse for not moving at all."4 While it must be admitted that
damages awarded for loss of marital consortium include compensa-
tion for the interruption of normal sexual relations that do not exist
in the parent-child relationship, courts should not overlook the fact
that consortium includes more than just sexual relations." Consor-
§ 203(1), 212 and 213(c) and (d) (1949). The several states have also enacted laws
which regulate the use of child labor within each state. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§
21-6-1 to -11 (1973 Replacement Vol.) as amended by W. VA. CODE §§ 21-6-2, -3, -
4, -7, -8(a) and -11 (Cum. Supp. 1977); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.701-17.730 (1975
Replacement Vol.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 31.1-31.22 (Smith-Hurd 1969) as
amended by ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 31.1, 31.2, 31.3, 31.6 31.7, 31.9, 31.13 and
31.19 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977).
0 Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 353, 113 N.W.2d 355, 359 (1961).
44 Id.
11 Baxter v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d
871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977).
11 See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 302 (1977) (analysis relied on in Baxter).The Baxter case involved the ques-
tion of a parent's right to recover loss of society and companionship for a
negligently-inflicted injury; the court found that the parent could not recover.
11 Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal3d 382, 404, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765,
779, 525 P.2d 669, 683 (1974).
0 Nicholson v. Blanchette, 239 Md. 168, 182-83, 210 A.2d 732, 740 (1965);
Murray v. Murray, 30 N.M. 557, 558-59, 240 P. 303, 304 (1925).
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 12
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol80/iss2/12
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
tium has been defined by various courts to include aid," comfort,"0
moral support, 1 affection,52 society 3 and companionship, as well as
sexual relations." The nonsexual loss suffered by a spouse is at
least as great as the sexual loss. The companionship and moral
support that a marriage provides is no less important to each
spouse than is the sexual side of the relationship.5 A parent should
not be denied an action for society and companionship lost when
his child is negligently injured or killed simply because the sexual
relations present in a marriage are not present in the parent-child
relationship. 8
The contention is also made that because the elements of
society and comipanionship are intangible they cannot be ade-
quately compensated and therefore should not be compensated at
all in order to avoid having a parent receive an award unrelated
to an injury.57 Universally, a parent would rather have the child
alive or uninjured than have monetary compensation for the loss.
While it is true that the monetary award cannot actually replace
the loss of society and companionship," courts frequently allow
damages in other areas where the impairment cannot be replaced.
Clearly, a monetary award cannot replace lost consortium; it can-
not replace an arm or a leg lost as a result of a tortiously inflicted
injury; it cannot replace sight to a man blinded by an accident, nor
healing to a man who is deaf. Nevertheless, courts regularly allow
" Henley v. Rockett, 243 Ala. 172, 174, 8 So.2d 852, 853 (1942); McMillan v.
Smith, 47 Ga. App. 646, 646, 171 S.E. 169, 170 (1933); Bradstreet v. Wallace, 254
Mass. 509, 510, 150 N.E. 405, 406 (1926).
10 Knighton v. Knighton, 252 Ala. 520, 523, 41 So.2d 172, 174 (1949); Thill v.
Modem Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 510, 170 N.W.2d 865, 867 (1969).
1, American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 455, 563 P.2d 858, 868, 138 Cal. Rptr.
302, 312 (1977) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
0 Little Rock Gas & Fuel Co. v. Coppedge, 116 Ark. 334, 349, 172 S.W. 885,
890 (1915); Lampe v. Lagomarcino-Grupe Co., 251 Iowa 204, 206, 100 N.W.2d 1,2
(1959).
11 Reeves v. Lutz, 179 Mo. App. 61, 85, 162 S.W. 280, 286 (1913); Cook v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 196 S.C. 230, 241, 13 S.E.2d 1,6 (1941); Dobrient v.
Ciskowski, 54 Wis. 2d 419, 423, 195 N.W.2d 449, 451 (1972).
51 E.g., Hobbs v. Holliman, 74 Ga. App. 735, 739, 41 S.E.2d 332, 335 (1947);
Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 88, 98 N.W.2d 669, 682 (1959); Hanson v.
Valdivia, 51 Wis. 2d 466, 473, 187 N.W.2d 151, 155 (1971).
11 Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 405-06, 525 P.2d 669,
684, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 780 (1974).
1, Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 456, 563 P.2d 858, 868, 138
Cal. Rptr. 302, 312 (1977) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 447, 563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
" Gresham v. Courson, 177 So.2d 33, 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
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damages under these circumstances" and the argument that the
injured item itself is not replaced is never heard. Lost society and
companionship is intangible, but to a parent, it is no less real an
injury than any of the injuries mentioned above."
Furthermore, extending liability for negligently inflicting loss
of a -child's society and companionship on a parent will not result
in an implied cause of action for other more distant relatives.
Courts may avoid the occurrence of any extension by placing an
express limitation on the allowed action to the parent-child rela-
tionship. An action for loss of society and companionship should
logically follow from the parent-child relationship." A court could
certainly allow the action without creating a corresponding claim
in brothers, sisters, cousins, aunts, uncles and friends.
The argument that it may be too much to ask a jury to distin-
guish the loss of a child's society and companionship from the loss
of services"2 is another position that has been rebutted by the very
courts that have advanced such a position. Juries regularly award
damages for pain and suffering," emotional distress and mental
anguish" in conjunction with damages for actual pecuniary loss.
These awards are regulated by trial court instructions which spell
out the elements of damages which may be considered. 5 Our sys-
tem of justice relies on the ability of the jury to so determine
damages in keeping with instructions of law given by the court.
Even when an excessive verdict is returned, the court has the duty
to reduce it to an amount reasonably commensurate with the
proven damages."5 Simply stated, the nature of the jury system
" Brandt v. C. F. Smith & Co., 242 Mich. 217, 218 N.W. 803 (1928) (blind-
ness); Gerdes v. Christopher & Simpson Architectural Iron & Foundry Co., 124 Mo.
347, 27 S.W. 615 (1894) (loss of a leg); Bjorndal v. Lane, 157 Mont. 543, 487 P.2d
527 (1971) (loss of a finger); Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. Roach, 52 Tex. Civ.
App. 95, 114 S.W. 418 (1908) (impairment of hearing).
8 The tortfeasor should not be allowed to shield his liability because monetary
compensation cannot actually replace that which is lost. When an injury has been
caused it ought to be compensated. Presently, monetary compensation is the
means available to do so.
" Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash.2d 112, 117, 426 P.2d 605, 609 (1967).
*2 See text accompanying notes 23-28, supra.
U E.g., American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Farmer, 77 Ga. App. 187, 48 S.E.2d
137 (1948).
,1 See Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970);
Monteleone v. Co-Operative Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 340, 36 S.E.2d 475 (1945).
" Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 107, 98 N.W.2d 669, 682 (1959).
" When an excessive verdict is rendered the trial judge may order that the
winning party enter a remittitur. If the party refuses, the case stands reversed and
10
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itself allows determination of these types of damages.
The most often-cited reason for not allowing a recovery by a
parent for lost society and companionship of a child is the lack of
judicial precedent." This argument is no longer valid. In the past
decade courts have increasingly stepped into this previously al-
most unexplored realm and permitted a recovery for lost society
and companionship by parents. Cases differ in approach, reason-
ing and limitations on the action, but all concur on one point: the
pecuniary-loss test is outmoded and does not, by itself, provide a
proper vehicle for assessing the damages a parent incurs when a
child has been injured.
One state supreme court has reasoned that lost society and
companionship is actually a "pecuniary loss" suffered by the par-
ent, as that term is used in the state's wrongful death statute. 8
Some statutes actually include loss of society and companionship
as express elements of damage in the wrongful death suit while
other statutes limit recovery for wrongful death to pecuniary loss
only, although pecuniary loss is not defined."2 Only Michigan has
gone so far as to interpret pecuniary loss to include society and
companionship." The Michigan Supreme Court was able to ration-
he can go before another jury at another trial. Jacksonville Tractor Co. v. Steelbach,
117 Fla. 233, 234, 157 So. 509 (1934); Annot., 95 A.L.R. 1163 (1935). Likewise, an
appellate court can order the reduction of compensatory damages when they are
excessive and if the winning party refuses, a new trial shall be ordered. Seested v.
Post Printing & Publishing Co., 326 Mo. 559, 31 S.W.2d 1045 (1930). The new trial,
if necessary, may either be de novo or confined to the determination of damages
with the previous finding of liability left standing, at the discretion of the court
ordering the new trial. Jacksonville Tractor Co. v. Steelbach, 117 Fla. at 234, 157
So. at 509. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 19 (1935).
1 Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an
Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590, 595 (1976).
u Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 352-53, 113 N.W.2d 355, 359 (1961). The
statute the court was interpreting may be found at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02, subd.
1 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
I' E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 30-810 (Reissue of 1975); N.Y. EST., Pow ns & TRUsTS LAW § 5.43 (McKin.
ney 1967).
10 Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960). But see Breckon
v. Franklin Fuel Co., 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836 (1970). In Breckon, the same
Michigan court said that it had never intended that its opinion in Wycko be inter-
preted as including loss of society and companionship as compensable elements of
pecuniary loss. In Smith v. City of Detroit, 388 Mich. 637, 202 N.W.2d 300 (1972),
the Michigan court reversed itself by expressly overruling Breckon and reinstating
the holding of Wycko, thus allowing loss of companionship as an element of dam-
ages under that state's Wrongful Death Act. Id. at 651, 202 N.W.2d at 304.
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alize this interpretation as one made in light of modem conditions.
Other statutes give little guidance as to the allowable elements of
recovery, and leave that determination to the judiciary.7 Some
wrongful death statutes specifically spell out lost society and com-
panionship as elements to be considered in awarding damages for
wrongful death.72 In states with the latter type of statutes there can
be no argument but that public policy favors the consideration of
these elements of damage, but courts in most of these states, and
in others where the loss is an allowable element of damages for
wrongful death of a child without express statutory authority, still
encounter self-inflicted difficulty in expanding the policy of in-
cluding elements of society and companionship to the cases where
the victim was negligently injured and survived. 3
Among the courts allowing an action by a parent for lost so-
ciety and companionship in a wrongful death suit, there is some
controversy concerning the effect of the child's reaching majority
In Bridges v. Stephens, 238 Ark. 801, 803, 384 S.Wd.2d 490, 492 (1964), the
Arkansas court held that the statutory language referring to "pecuniary injuries"
is not limited to a strictly financial support interpretation, but rather should
"include compensation for the loss of love, care, supervision, and training." The
court in Bridges was addressing the question as it related to a child's recovery for
the wrongful death of a parent.
71 E.g., IDAHO CODE § 5-311 ((Cur. Supp. 1977); UTAH Con ANN. § 78-11-7
(1953). These statutory provisions contain language to the effect that damages will
be allowed that are, under all the circumstances, fair and just.
72 E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1055 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); VA.
CODE § 8.01-52 (1977 Replacement Vol.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-6 (Cur. Supp.
1977).
11 California is a prime example of this. In Baxter v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977), the Califor-
nia court rejected an attempt to include loss of society and companionship as an
element of damages in a personal injury case. Earlier, in an action by a husband
for his wife's wrongful death, the same court allowed the elements of lost society
and companionship to be included in the recovery. Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal.3d
59, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 562 P.2d 1022 (1971). This distinction seems to be untenable.
It is difficult to understand how a court can rationalize that a parent whose child
becomes permanently bed-ridden due to an injury is not suffering loss of society
and companionship while a parent whose child is killed does. In either case, the
parents are deprived of the normal relations that they would usually enjoy during
their mutual lives. In each instance the child in unable to play ball with his father
or go shopping with her mother or participate with the family on picnics or a
thousand other things that are the natural outgrowth of the parent-child relation-
ship. While it must be admitted that the personal injury cases will usually involve
injuries less severe than this, the jury can determine the damages for loss of society
and companionship actually lost as a result of the injury actually incurred, just is
they now determine the value of such in a wrongful death action.
12
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on the parent's ability to maintain the action. Among the small
number of jurisdictions presently allowing the action no consensus
is yet discernible. The courts can choose from among several op-
tions in this regard: 1) the injury must occur while the child is a
minor and damages will be limited to the remaining period of
minority;"4 2) the injury must occur while the child is a minor, but
damages may be awarded for the expectancy of the parent-child
mutual life7 5 and 3) a cause of action will accrue to parents regard-
less of the child's age at the time of the accident."
Some courts have given damages for "loss of services" in such
amount that it seems obvious that, without saying so, they are
allowing recovery for loss of society and companionship.Y A much
more realistic situation would exist if these courts would announce
that they are allowing compensation for loss of society and com-
panionship so that juries can know for what they are awarding
damages, and therefore make a more informed and more knowl-
edgeable determination.
78
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Shockley v. Prier 7 may
have loosened the single key stone that will cause the nation's
courts to follow suit and allow this cause of action to be more
widely accepted. The court in Shockley began by noting that the
age old rule denying the recovery was court-made and hence could
be court-changed, without previous precedent, in light of modern
societal conditions." The court then proceeded to explain which
various policy reasons it relied on and why the recent cases in other
jurisdictions expressly denying such a cause of action were insuffi-
7, See Wardlow v. Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1971).
" Cf. Currie v. Fitting, 375 Mich. 440, 134 N.W.2d 611 (1965).
T' Kelley v. Ohio River R.R. Co., 58 W. Va. 216, 52 S.E. 520 (1905). In this case,
the father, 75 years old, was allowed to maintain an action for his son's wrongful
death. His son was 37 years old at the time of his death.
" Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 354, 113 N.W.2d 355, 360 (1961). The
Minnesota court says that it has long allowed excessive verdicts to stand without
close scrutiny to determine the actual extent of monetary loss. As examples of this
practice the court cited Tollafson v. Ehlers, 252 Minn. 370, 90 N.W.2d 205 (1958);
Schroht v. Voll, 245 Minn. 114, 71 N.W.2d 843 (1955); and Moore v. Palen, 228
Minn. 148, 36 N.W.2d 540 (1949).
" If verdicts are going to be allowed which include elements that are not
ordinarily equated in dollar value, jurors should be so instructed in the interest of
fairness and uniformity. Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 359, 113 N.W.2d 355,
362-63 (1961).
66 Wis.2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).
Id. at 397, 225 N.W.2d at 497.
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cient to convince it not to take the step it did.8
The "Pandora's Box effect" feared by many courts was
avoided by the Shockley court because the court limited the action
to the parent-child relationship and to cases arising after the date
of the opinion. Further, the claim was limited to those cases where
the parent's cause of action is combined with that of the child's
for his personal injuries. 2 These limitations make the opinion re-
strictive as to its application and avoid any inference of a logical
extension of such a claim to any relationship more remote than
that of parent-child.
I. THE VIEw IN WEST VIRGM
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has not directly
considered the allowance of loss of society and companionship as
an element of damages for a parent in a personal injury action, but
in all cases dealing with a parent's recovery for a child's injury, the
recovery has been limited to the pecuniary loss.U In Jordon v.
" The court noted in its unanimous decision that it had already broken the
common law rules and allowed an action to a wife for loss of consortium in Moran
v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis.2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967), and that
by doing so, it showed the genius of the common law to be its ability to adapt to
the changing needs of society. The court further explained that society and its views
of children have changed since the common law rule was formulated and in light
of these changes, the old pecuniary-loss test is now inadequate. "[Tioday's rela-
tionship between parents and children is, or should be, more than that between
master and servant." 66 Wis.2d at 402, 225 N.W.2d at 500. The court also based
its conclusion on recent decisions in the wrongful death area that have allowed
society and companionship to be considered as elements of damages, and cited
Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash.2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967), as the leading case.
12 66 Wis.2d at 404, 225 N.W.2d at 501.
" A possible obstacle to West Virginia's adoption of society and companion-
ship as elements of damage in a personal injury action may be in the state's consti-
tution which states that the common law shall continue as the law in West Virginia
until altered or repealed by the legislature. W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13. Further,
W. VA. CODE § 2-1-1 (1971 Replacement Vol.) requires that the common law of
England "except in those respects wherein it was altered by the general assembly
of Virginia" before West Virginia was granted statehood on June 20, 1863, shall
remain the law until altered by the legislature. The English common law only
allowed damages for the pecuniary loss, measured by loss of services, in which
society and companionship played no part. See Katz, Schioeder & Sidman,
Emancipating Our Children-Coming of Legal Age in America, 7 FAM. L.Q. 211
(1973). Neither the Virginia assembly, prior to 1863, nor the West Virginia legisla-
ture since that time have changed the English common law rule with respect to the
allowable elements of damage in a personal injury suit, though both states have
made the express change, in regard to wrongful death, of allowing loss of society
and companionship as elements of damage the jury may consider. VA. CODE § 8.01-
52 (1977 Replacement Vol.); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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Bero,8 ' the court ruled out the possibility of allowing the recovery
under the guise of loss of services, by stating, "A verdict which is
not supported by the evidence or is so large that it indicates that
the jury was influenced by passion, partiality, prejudice or enter-
tained a mistaken view of the case, should be set aside.""8 Conse-
quently, evidence tending to establish the probability of future
pecuniary loss to the parents must be shown in order to allow any
recovery for damages in West Virginia, and lost society and com-
panionship are not included therein.
The situation is vastly different in the field of wrongful death.
Case law has long allowed these elements to be considered under
the wrongful death statute and gives the jury the ability to award
damages deemed "fair and just" up to $10,000.8 In 1976, the legis-
lature took West Virginia one step farther by enacting a new
wrongful death statute which expressly allows society and compan-
ionship to be considered as elements of damages, and provides no
limitation on the amount that can be awarded, other than that it
be "fair and just.""7 The cause of action for wrongful death exists
for any parent and is unrestricted by limits on the child's age. In
West Virginia, whether the child had reached majority is of no
consequence to the parent's cause of action for wrongful death."8
IV. CONCLUSION
The majority of American jurisdictions still cling to the old
pecuniary-loss test in determining an award for a child's injury in
an action brought by the parent. Such reliance on principles that
relate back to a period when children worked long hours each day
in a factory is a failure to recognize the true conditions of modern
society and the relationships that exist as a result thereof. Taken
to its extreme, a strict application of the pecuniary-loss test would
more times than not result in a parent returning from a wrongful
death or personal injury action empty-handed, as the cost of rais-
ing a child has, in most instances, now exceeded the services and
earnings a child can provide to the parent.
The modem approach that some courts have taken is a realis-
- 210 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1974).
210 S.E.2d at 639.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (1966) (current version at W. VA. CoDE § 55-7-6 (Cum.
Supp. 1977)).
"W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
98 Kelley v. Ohio River R.R. Co., 58 W. Va. 216, 52 S.E. 520 (1905).
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tic one that compensates a parent for the real loss he suffers as a
result of a child's negligent injury or death. The elements of dam-
ages to be considered are honestly presented to the jury, so the jury
is left in a position to be fairer in assessing the damages and to
avoid the temptation to ignore the language of the law and make
awards in excess of those the parent is entitled to recover.
Just as courts have recognized that a wife has a cause of action
for loss of consortium when her husband is injured," so too should
the loss of society and companionship in the parent-child relation-
ship eventually be accepted. The age-old rationale for denying a
parent an action for society and companionship ought to crumble
in the face of twentieth century realities and the drastic change
that has occurred in a child's place in society.
Michael B. Victorson
See, e.g., Brennan v. Biber, 93 N.J. Super. 351, 225 A.2d 742 (1966), affl'd,
99 N.J. Super. 247, 239 A.2d 261 (1968).
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